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In spite of its relevance to the origin of complex networks, the interplay between form and function and
its role during network formation remains largely unexplored. While recent studies introduce dynamics by
considering rewiring processes of a pre-existent network, we study network growth and formation by proposing
an evolutionary preferential attachment model, its main feature being that the capacity of a node to attract new
links depends on a dynamical variable governed in turn by the node interactions. As a specific example, we
focus on the problem of the emergence of cooperation by analyzing the formation of a social network with
interactions given by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The resulting networks show many features of real systems, such
as scale-free degree distributions, cooperative behavior and hierarchical clustering. Interestingly, results such as
the cooperators being located mostly on nodes of intermediate degree are very different from the observations
of cooperative behavior on static networks. The evolutionary preferential attachment mechanism points to an
evolutionary origin of scale-free networks and may help understand similar feedback problems in the dynamics
of complex networks by appropriately choosing the game describing the interaction of nodes.
PACS numbers: 05.45.Xt, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, it has been increasingly realized that
there are many situations which are not well described by
well-mixed (mean-field) models, lattices and uniformly dis-
tributed spatial models. This is the case with the majority of
the so called complex systems, that are better characterized
by what is generally known as complex networks [1, 2]. In
many of these networks, the distribution of the number of in-
teractions, k, that an individual shares with the rest of the el-
ements of the system, P (k), is found to follow a power-law,
P (k) ∼ k−γ , with 2 < γ < 3 in most cases. The ubiq-
uity in Nature of these so-called scale-free (SF) networks has
led scientists to propose many models aimed at reproducing
the SF degree distribution [1, 2]. Most of the existing ap-
proaches are based on growth rules that depend on the instan-
taneous topological properties of the network and therefore
neglect the connection of the structural evolution and the par-
ticular function of the network. However, accumulated evi-
dence suggests, moreover, that form follows function [3] and
that the formation of the network is also related to the dynam-
ical states of its components through a feedback mechanism
that shapes its structure.
On the other hand, a paradigmatic case study of the struc-
ture and dynamics of complex systems is that of social net-
works. In these systems, it is particularly relevant to under-
stand how cooperative behavior emerges. The mathematical
approach to model the (cooperative versus defective) interac-
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tions is usually tackled under the general framework of evolu-
tionary game theory through diverse social dilemmas. In the
general case it is the individual benefit rather than the overall
welfare what drives the system evolution. The emergence of
cooperation in natural and social systems has been the subject
of intense research recently [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
These works are based either on the assumption of an underly-
ing, given static network (or two static, separate networks for
interaction and imitation [14]) or a coevolution and rewiring
starting from a fully developed network that already includes
all the participating elements. The results show that if the
well-mixed population hypothesis is abandoned, so that in-
dividuals only interact with their neighbors, cooperation is
promoted on heterogeneous networks, specifically on SF net-
works. However, the main questions remain unanswered: Are
cooperative behavior and structural properties of networks re-
lated or linked in any way? If so, how? Moreover, if SF net-
works are best suited to support cooperation, then, where did
they come from? What are the mechanisms that shape the
structure of the system?
In this paper we analyze the growth and formation of com-
plex networks by coupling the network formation rules to the
dynamical states of the elements of the system. With the prob-
lem of the emergence of cooperation as a specific application
in mind, we consider that the nodes of the network are indi-
viduals involved in a social dilemma and that newcomers are
preferentially linked to nodes with high fitness, the latter be-
ing proportional to the payoffs obtained in the game. In this
way, the fitness of an element is not imposed as an external
constraint [15, 16], but rather it is the result of the dynamical
evolution of the system. At the same time, the network is not
exogenously imposed as a starting point but instead it grows
from a small seed and acquires its structure during its forma-
2tion process. The main result of this interplay is the forma-
tion of homogeneous and heterogeneous networks that share
a number of topological features with real world networks
such as a high clustering and degree-degree correlations. Re-
markably, the set of nodes sustaining the observed aggregate
behavior is very different from that arising in a complex but
otherwise static network. As a particular but most relevant
conclusion, we find that the mechanism we propose not only
explains why heterogeneous networks are tailored to sustain
cooperation, but also provides an evolutionary mechanism for
their origin.
II. EVOLUTIONARY PREFERENTIAL ATTACHMENT
MODEL
Our model naturally incorporates an intrinsic feedback be-
tween dynamics and topology. The growth of the network
starts at time t = 0 with a core of m0 fully connected nodes.
New elements are incorporated to the network and attached
to m existing nodes with a probability that depends on the
dynamics of each node. In particular, we consider that the
dynamics is dictated by the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game.
In this two-players game, every node initially adopts with the
same probability [17] one of the two available strategies, co-
operation C or defection D. At equally spaced time intervals
(denoted by τD) each node i of the network plays with its
ki(t) neighbors and the obtained payoffs are considered to be
the measure of its evolutionary fitness, fi(t). There are three
possible situations for each link in the network: (i) if two co-
operators meet both receive R, when (ii) two defectors play
both receive P , while (iii) if a cooperator and a defector com-
pite the former receives S and the latter obtains T . The four
payoffs are ordered as T = b > R = 1 > P = S = 0. After
playing, every node i compares its evolutionary fitness (pay-
off) with that corresponding to a randomly chosen neighbor
j. If fj(t) > fi(t) node i adopts the strategy of player j with
probability [18]
Pi =
fj(t)− fi(t)
b ·max [ki(t), kj(t)]
. (1)
The growth of the network proceeds by adding a new node
with m links to the preexisting ones at equally spaced time
intervals (denoted by τT ). The probability that any node i in
the network receives one of the m new links is
Πi(t) =
1− ǫ+ ǫfi(t)
∑N(t)
j=1 (1− ǫ + ǫfj(t))
, (2)
where N(t) is the size of the network at time t. The parameter
ǫ ∈ [0, 1) thus controls the weight of the fi(t)’s during the
growth of the network. When ǫ > 0, nodes with fi(t) 6= 0 are
preferentially chosen.
The growth of the network as defined above is thus linked
to an evolutionary dynamics and controlled by the parame-
ter ǫ and the two associated time scales (τT and τD). When
ǫ ≃ 0, referred to as the weak selection limit [11], the network
growth is independent of the evolutionary dynamics as all
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FIG. 1: The upper panel shows degree distributions obtained for sev-
eral values of ǫ for b = 1.5. A transition from homogeneous to
SF networks is evident. In the bottom panel, we have depicted the
(color-coded) average level of cooperation, 〈c〉, as a function of the
temptation to defect b and the selection pressure ǫ. The networks are
made up of 103 nodes with 〈k〉 = 4 and τD = 10τT .
nodes are basically equiprobable. Alternatively, in the strong
selection limit, ǫ→ 1, the fittest players (highest payoffs) are
much more likely to attract the newcomers. Therefore, Eq. (2)
can be viewed as an “Evolutionary Preferential Attachment”
mechanism. We have carried out numerical simulations of the
model exploring the (ǫ, b)-space. In what follows, we focus
on the results obtained when τD/τT > 1, namely, the net-
work growth is faster than the evolutionary dynamics [19].
Taking τT = 1 as the reference time, networks are generated
by adding nodes every time step, while they play at discrete
times given by τD. As τD > τT , the linking procedure is done
with the payoffs obtained the last time the nodes played [20].
All results for each value of b and ǫ reported have been aver-
aged over at least 103 realizations and the number of links of
a newcomer is taken to be m = 2, whereas m0 = 3.
3FIG. 2: Probability that a node with connectivity k plays as a coop-
erator for different values of b in the strong selection limit (ǫ = 0.99)
at the end of the growth of a network with N = 1000 nodes.
III. RESULTS
The dependence of the degree distribution on ǫ is shown
in Fig.1 for b = 1.5. As can be seen, the weak selection
limit produces homogeneous networks characterized by a tail
that decays exponentially fast with k. Alternatively, when ǫ
is large, scale-free networks arise. Although this might a pri-
ori be expected from the definition of the growth rules, this
needs not be the case: Indeed, it must be taken into account
that in a one-shot PD game defection is the best strategy re-
gardless of the opponent strategy. However, if the network
dynamics evolves into a state in which all players (or a large
part of the network) are defectors, they will often play against
themselves and their payoffs will be reduced. The system’s
dynamics will then end up in a state close to an all-D config-
uration rendering fi(t) = 0 ∀i ∈ [1, N(t)] in Eq.(2). From
this point on, new nodes will attach randomly to other exist-
ing nodes [see Eq.(2)] and therefore no hubs can come out.
This turns out not to be the case, which indicates that for hav-
ing some degree of heterogeneity, a nonzero level of cooper-
ation is needed. Conversely, the heterogeneous character of
the system provides a feedback mechanism for the survival of
cooperators that would not outcompete defectors otherwise.
The degree of heterogeneity of the networks in the strong
selection limit depends slightly on b. The results indicate that
when ǫ→ 1, networks with the highest degree of heterogene-
ity, corresponding to the largest values of b, are not those with
maximal cooperation levels. In Fig. 1, we have also repre-
sented the average level of cooperation, 〈c〉, as a function of
the two model parameters ǫ and b. The figure shows that as ǫ
grows for a fixed value of b & 1, the level of cooperation in-
creases. In particular, in the strong selection limit 〈c〉 attains
its maximum value. This is a somewhat counterintuitive result
as in the limit ǫ → 1, new nodes are preferentially linked to
those with the highest payoffs, which for the PD game, should
correspond to defectors. However, the population achieves the
highest value of 〈c〉. On the other hand, higher levels of coop-
eration are achieved in heterogeneous rather than in homoge-
FIG. 3: Degree of cooperation when the last node of the network is
incorporated, 〈c〉, and the average fraction of cooperators observed
when the system is time-evolved 〈c〉∞ after the network growth ends.
Both magnitudes are shown as a function of b for τD = 10τT . See
the text for further details.
neous topologies, which is consistent with previous findings
[4, 5, 6].
The interplay between the local structure of the network and
the hierarchical organization of cooperation is highly nontriv-
ial. Contrary to what has been reported for static scale-free
networks [4, 6], Fig.2 shows that as the temptation to defect
increases, the likelihood that cooperators occupy the hubs de-
creases. Indeed, during network growth, cooperators are lo-
calized neither at the hubs nor at the lowly connected nodes,
but in intermediate degree classes. It is important to realize
that this is a new effect that originates in the competition be-
tween network growth and the evolutionary dynamics. In par-
ticular, it highlights the differences between the microscopic
organization in the steady state for the PD game in static net-
works with that found when the network is evolving. We will
come back to this question in the Discussion section below.
To confirm the robustness of the networks generated by
evolutionary preferential attachment, let us consider the real-
istic situation that after incorporating a (possibly large) num-
ber of participants, network growth stops when a given size
N is reached, and that afterward only evolutionary dynam-
ics takes place. In Fig. 3, we compare the average level of
cooperation 〈c〉 when the network ceased to grow with the
same quantity, but computed after allowing the evolutionary
dynamics to evolve many more time steps 〈c〉∞ (without at-
taching new nodes). The green area indicates the region of
the parameter b where the level of cooperation increases with
respect to that at the moment the network stops growing. On
the contrary, the red zone shows that beyond a certain value
of b ≈ 2.5, cooperative behavior does not survive and the
system dynamics evolves to an all-D state. The increment of
〈c〉 when going from the steady state reached during network
growth to the stationary regime attained once the underlying
structure is static, has its roots on the fixation of cooperation
in high degree classes, thus recovering the picture described
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FIG. 4: Dependence of the clustering coefficient CC(k) ∼ k−β with
the nodes’ degrees for different values of b in the strong selection
limit. The straight line is a guide to the eye and corresponds to k−1.
in [6]. On the other hand, when b & 2.5, the few coopera-
tors present in the growing network are not able to invade the
hubs and finally, after a few more generations, cooperation
is extinguished yielding 〈c〉∞ = 0. This result highlights the
phenomenological difference between playing simultaneously
to the growth of the underlying network and playing on fixed,
static networks.
Another striking feature emerging from the interaction be-
tween network growth and the evolutionary dynamics is cap-
tured in Fig. 4, where the clustering coefficient, CC, has been
represented as a function of the nodes degrees in the strong se-
lection limit for several values of b. This coefficient measures
the ratio of the number of triangles existing on the network
over the total possible number of triangles, which relates to
the possibility that a node connecting to a neighbor of another
is also connected to this last one. Specifically, we will look
at CC(k), i.e., the way this coefficient depends on the degree
of the node. Interestingly enough, the dependence of CC(k)
is consistent with a hierarchical organization expressed by the
power law CC(k) ∼ k−β , a statistical feature found to de-
scribe many real-world networks [2]. The behavior of CC(k)
in Fig. 4 can be understood by recalling that in scale-free net-
works, cooperators are not extinguished even for large values
of b if they organize into clusters of cooperators that provide
the group with a stable source of benefits [6].
IV. DISCUSSION
Having presented our main simulation results, we now dis-
cuss them in detail and provide an interpretation of our obser-
vations that allows an understanding of the model behavior.
To begin with, let us consider the emergence of cooperation
in the resulting network in the strong selection limit (ǫ → 1).
The organization of the cooperator nodes explains why co-
operation survives and constitutes a unique positive feedback
mechanism for the survival of cooperation. For simplicity, let
us focus on how cycles of length 3 (i.e., those contributing to
CC) arise and grow. When a new node j enters the network,
it will preferentially attach to m (recall we are using m = 2)
nodes with the highest payoff. Two situations are likely. On
the one hand, it may link to a defector hub with a high pay-
off. As the newcomer receives less payoff than the hub, it
will sooner or later imitate its strategy and therefore will get
trapped playing as a defector with fj = 0. Subsequently, node
j will not attract any links during network growth. On the
other hand, if the new node attaches to a cooperator cluster, the
other source of high payoff, and forms a triad with the cluster
elements, two outcomes are possible depending on its initial
strategy. If the newly attached node plays as a defector, the
triad may eventually be invaded by defectors and may end up
in the long run in a state where the nodes have no capacity to
receive new links. Conversely, if it plays as a cooperator, the
group will be reinforced, both in its robustness against defec-
tor invasion and in its overall fitness to attract new links, i.e.,
playing as a cooperator while taking part in a successful (high
fitness) cooperator cluster reinforces its future success, while
playing as a defector undermines its future fitness and leads to
dynamically (and topologically) frozen (fi = 0) structures, so
that defection cannot take long-term advantage from cooper-
ator clusters. Therefore, cooperator clusters that emerge from
cooperator triads to which new cooperators are attached can
then continue to grow if more cooperators are attracted or even
if defectors attach to the nodes whose connectivity verifies
k > mb. Moreover, the stability of cooperator clusters and its
global fitness grow with their size, specially for their members
with higher degree, and naturally favors the formation of tri-
ads among its components. Note, additionally, that it follows
from the above mechanism that a node of degree k is a vertex
of (k − 1) triangles and then CC(k) = (k−1)k(k−1)/2 = 2/k, the
sort of functional form for the clustering coefficient reported
in Fig. 4.
Another interesting phenomenon arising from our model is
the fact, previously unobserved, that cooperators occupy the
nodes with intermediate degree and the hubs are defectors, in
contrast with the simulations on static networks [6, 7]. To
address this issue we have developed a simple analytical ar-
gument. Let kci be the number of cooperator neighbors of a
given node i. Its fitness is fdi = bkci , if node i is a defector,
and f ci = kci , if it is a cooperator. The value of kci is expected
to change due to both network growth (node accretion flow, at
a pace of one new node each time unit τT ) and imitation pro-
cesses that take place at a pace τD . We will focus on the case
in which τD is much larger than τT . The expected increase of
fitness is
∆fi = ∆flowfi +∆evolfi, (3)
where ∆flow means the variation of fitness in node i due to
the newcomers flow, and ∆evol stands for the change in fitness
due to changes of neighbors’ strategies. The above expression
would lead to an expected increase in kci given by
kci (t+ τD)− k
c
i (t) = ∆k
c
i = ∆flowk
c
i +∆evolk
c
i . (4)
5On the other hand, the expected increase of degree in the in-
terval (t, t + τD) only has the contribution from newcomers
flow and takes the form (recall that new nodes are generated
with the same probability to be cooperators or defectors)
∆ki = ∆flowki = 2∆flowk
c
i . (5)
If the fitness (hence connectivity) of node i is high enough
as to attract a significant part of the newcomers flow, the first
term in Eq. (3) dominates at short time scales, and then the
hub degree ki increases exponentially. Connectivity patterns
are then dominated by the growth by preferential attachment,
ensuring as in the Baraba´si-Albert [21] model that the net-
work will have a SF degree distribution. Moreover, the rate of
increase
∆flowk
c
i =
1
2
mτD
fi∑
j fj
(6)
is larger for a defector hub (by a factor b) because of its larger
fitness, and then one should expect hubs to be mostly defec-
tors, as confirmed by the results shown in Fig. 2. This small
set of most connected defector nodes attracts most of the new-
comers flow.
On the contrary, for nodes of intermediate degree, say of
connectivity m ≪ ki ≪ kmax, the term ∆flowfi in Eq. (3)
can be neglected, i.e., the arrival of new nodes is a rare event,
so that for a large time scale, k˙i = 0. Note that if k˙i(t) = 0
for all t in an interval t0 ≤ t ≤ t0 + T , the size of the neigh-
borhood is constant during the whole interval T and thus the
evolutionary dynamics of strategies through imitiation is the
exclusive responsible for the strategic field configuration in
the neighborhood of node i. During these stasis periods the
probability distribution of strategies approaches that of a static
network in the neighborhood of node i. It is clear that this sce-
nario can be occasionally subject to sudden (avalanche-type
of) perturbations following ”punctuated equilibrium” patterns
in the rare ocasions in which a new node arrive. Recalling that
the probability for this node i of intermediate degree to be a
cooperator is large in the static regime [6] we then arrive to
the conclusion that for these nodes the density of cooperators
must reach a maximum, in agreement with Fig. 2. Further-
more, our simulations show that these features of the shape of
the curve are indeed preserved as time goes by, giving further
support to the above argument based on time scale separation
and confirming that our understanding of the mechamisms at
work in the model is correct.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have presented a model in which the rules
governing the formation of the network are linked to the dy-
namics of its components. The model provides an evolu-
tionary explanation for the origin of the two most common
types of networks found in natural systems: When the selec-
tion pressure is weak, homogeneous networks arise, whereas
strong selection pressure gives rise to scale-free networks. A
remarkable fact is that the proposed evolution rule gives rise to
complex networks that share many topological features with
those measured in real systems, such as the power law de-
pendence of the clustering coefficient with the degree of the
nodes. Interestingly, our results make it clear that the micro-
scopic dynamical organization of strategists in evolutionarily
grown networks is very different from the case in which the
population evolves on static networks. Furthermore, as we
have seen, the generated networks are robust in the sense that
after the growth process stops, the dynamical behavior keeps
its character.
Thinking of the specific application we are discussing here,
the emergence of cooperation, it is particularly remarkable
the special role of individuals with an intermediate number
of connections. As we have reasoned above, as time pro-
ceeds and the network grows, cooperation increases by in-
vading those intermediate nodes, and on the other hand the
range of intermediate degrees grows as well, leading to fur-
ther increase of cooperation. On the contrary, hubs or well
connected nodes, which on the static scenario are the support-
ers of cooperation, in the evolutionary process are defectors
that thrive and accumulate new nodes by being so, only to
fall eventually in the class of intermediate degree nodes and
become cooperators. The analogy with the effect of a well-
doing middle class in a western-like society is tempting but
would of course be too far-fetched to push it beyond a general
resemblance. Nevertheless, one particular situation in which
models like this, based on the evolutionary preferential attach-
ment mechanism, may prove very relevant is in the formation
of social networks of entrepreneurs or professionals, such as
those studied in Silicon Valley [22, 23]. The way these net-
works grow upon arrival of new individuals and subsequent
cooperative interactions made them a natural scenario to ap-
ply these ideas in detail. Finally, another important conclusion
is the resilience of the cooperative behavior arising in these
networks, in so far as it does not decrease for a wide range
of parameters upon stopping the growth process, and, in most
cases it even exhibits a large increase of the cooperation level.
On more general theoretical grounds, figuring out why
scale-free networks are so ubiquitous in Nature is one of the
most challenging aspects of modern network theory. At vari-
ance with previous hypotheses, the evolutionary preferential
attachment mechanism of Eq. (2) naturally incorporates a
competition between structural and dynamical patterns and
hence it suffices to explain why SF networks are optimized to
show both structural and dynamical robustness. The former is
given by the scale-free nature of the resulting topology, while
the latter is based on the high levels of cooperation attained in
the grown networks. Note that this optimization acts at a lo-
cal level since individuals search their own benefit rather than
following a global optimization scheme [24], to be compared
with the fact that the resulting network has a very good coop-
eration level as a whole. Finally, we let for future research the
question of whether Eq. (2) can be applied to other sort of dy-
namics by appropriately defining the dynamical variable fi(t)
and adjusting the growth rules. It is however reasonable to as-
sume that the functional form in Eq. (2) may render general
for generating optimized SF networks.
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